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PANZIRER V WOLF: AN EXTENSION OF THE
FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY
OF LIABILITY UNDER SEC
RULE 10b-5
The Securities and Exchange Commission's rule lOb-5,1 promulgated
pursuant to section 10(b)2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, prohibits
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.3 The rule's
broad antifraud provisions are designed to protect investors by promoting
full disclosure of information in lieu of the preexisting doctrine of caveat
emptor.4 The rule thus embraces the philosophy inherent in the securities
1. Rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
2. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange--
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
3. See supra notes 1-2.
4. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
Implementation of full disclosure is, however, one among many policies underlying rule
lOb-5. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) (protecting investors); see
also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1983) (achieving high stan-
dards of business ethics in the industry); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 324 n.6 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied (deterring fraud and compensating investors), 429 U.S. 1053 (1977);
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied (maintaining free and honest
markets), 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974)
(encouraging investor confidence in the securities market). For a full discussion of policies
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laws that full and accurate disclosure of information will promote knowl-
edgeable investment decisions and will ensure that the price of securities
accurately reflects their intrinsic value.5
While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission)
has authority to enforce the rule,6 neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 ex-
pressly provides a private right of action for defrauded investors.7 Al-
though there is very little documented evidence of Congress's intent in
enacting section 10(b)8 or of the SEC's purpose in promulgating rule lOb-
fostered by the rule, see 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5
§§ 6.00-6.09 (2d ed. 1981).
5. One theory underlying the securities laws' mandatory disclosure requirements is the
"efficient market hypothesis," whereby information about a company is instantly reflected in
the price of that company's stock. For a full discussion of the efficient market hypothesis,
see Note, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesi:
4 Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 1077 (1977); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION, 163-67 (5th ed. 1982); see also In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D.
134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980); cf Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). For a discussion of the efficient market hypothesis in rule lOb-5
actions where fraud has affected the market, see Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982).
6. The SEC can gather information through investigation and turn it over to the
United States Attorney General for use in criminal proceedings, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1976).
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides for fines of up to $10,000 and imprison-
ment for up to five years for willful violations of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976). Moreover,
the SEC may obtain civil injunctions barring further violations of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(e) (1976), or seeking ancillary relief such as disgorgement of profits for the benefit of
defrauded investors. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1979).
The SEC does not, however, have enough personnel and time to pursue all meritorious
claims. In view of the SEC's limited arsenal for punishing those who violate the securities
laws, the implied private right of action under rule lOb-5 is seen as an important supplement
to Commission enforcement. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
730 (1975) (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (implied private right of
action for proxy violation)); see also 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 8.01, 1-109 ("[tihe main
source of enforcement is private attorneys general bringing suit 'as a necesary supplement to
Commission action' "). For more complete discussion of the SEC's role in enforcing rule
10b-5, see 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 15.
7. Several provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 expressly create a private right of action. Securities Act §§ 11, 12, & 15, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k, 771, 77o (1976); Securities Exchange Act §§ 9, 16, & 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p, 78r
(1976).
8. What is now § 10(b) was originally drafted as § 9(c) of the Exchange Act. H.R.
7852 & S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. 8720 & S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)
(second version of proposed § 9(c)). Thomas G. Corcoran, the Administration's spokesman,
stated that "[s]ubsection (c) [now § 10(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning
devices."' Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Comn on Interstate
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934).
The House report commenting on § 10(b) states only that it is designed to prohibit such
fraud as may be "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
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5,9 courts implied a private right of action under the rule as early as
1947.10 Today, the existence of this implied private right of recovery is not
investors." H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934). Similarly, the Senate
Committee Report, making reference to the purpose of § 10(b) in protecting the "interests
of investors," is of little help to courts interpreting § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934). For a comprehensive legislative history of the secur-
ities laws, see Duncan, Selected Bibliography Including Legislative History of the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Statutes it Administers, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 938
(1959); see also 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 5.01. For cases discussing the lack of evi-
dence of Congress's intent in enacting § 10(b), see Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473 n.13;
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196, 196 n.14.
9. Rule lOb-5 was designed to close a loophole in the coverage of the securities laws'
antifraud provisions. While §§ 11, 12(1), 12(2) & 17(a) of the Securities Act expressly pro-
hibit fraudulent sales of securities, they only cover -fraud in connection with the sale of
securities. Securities Exchange Act § 15 prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase of
securities, but covers brokerage transactions in the over-the-counter markets. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o (1976). The promulgating release for rule lOb-5 states that it "closes a loophole in the
protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or
companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase." SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942); see 8 SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1942) (rule lOb-5 "prohibits
fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities, while the previously ex-
isting rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers"); accord SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 3634, 1 (Dec. 22, 1944). For an interesting account of the facts
leading up to the promulgation of rule 1Ob-5, see the remarks of Milton V. Freeman in
Conference on the Cod#Fcation of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
For a thorough discussion of the administrative history of the rule, see 5 A. JACOBS, supra
note 4, at § 5.02; Duncan, supra note 8; see also Huddleston, 51 U.S.L.W., at 4104 (discussing
the lack of evidence of SEC intent in promulgating rule lOb-5); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196,
196 n. 15 (citing SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942)).
10. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). For a discussion
of the lower court decisions recognizing the implied right of recovery under the rule during
the years 1947-197 1, see Huddleston, 51 U.S.L.W. at 4101 n.10.
The elements of a rule lOb-5 private right of action are:
(1) a misstatement of material facts or a failure to disclose material facts. A fact is "mate-
rial" if a reasonable investor would consider it important when making an investment deci-
sion. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1976), discussed infra note
16;
(2) the fraud "in connection with" a "purchase or sale of any security." See supra notes 1-
2. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casuality Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971), the
Supreme Court broadly interpreted the "in connection with" language of the rule and stat-
ute to mean that the proscribed act "touches" upon the particular purchase or sale. In Blue
Chip Stamps, however, the Court restrictively construed "purchase or sale" by requiring an
actual, as opposed to potential, purchase or sale. 421 U.S. at 747, discussed infra note 12;
(3) an intention to deceive, manipulate or defraud. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193;
(4) reliance on the misstatement or omission. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,
188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1427 (1982); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,
640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), af9'd in part and rev'd in part, 103 S. CT. 683 (1983). But
see infra note 17 (reliance is not necessary when the alleged fraud is nondisclosure and may
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only unquestioned," but also has become, by judicial interpretation and
construction, the most widely invoked provision of the securities laws in
civil suits for damages.12 The implied private right of action created under
be presumed in actions involving omissions, misrepresentations, or fraud affecting the mar-
ket); and
(5) a causal connection between the violation of the rule and the injury. Affiliated Ute
Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153-54. See infra notes 18 & 72.
1i. In 1971, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized a private right of action for viola-
tions of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Superintendent oflns., 404 U.S. at 13 n.9; see Huddleston,
103 S. Ct. at 687 ("[The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure");
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196 and cases cited therein; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)
(four factors to consider in determining whether a private right of action should be implied);
cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982) (private
right of action implied under the Commodities Exchange Act); Transamerica Mortgage Ad-
visors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no implied private right of action under § 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no private
right of action under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act).
To imply a private right of action, early cases looked to the common law tort principle
that a private right of action is predicated on the grounds that a person injured by a viola-
tion of a statute enacted for his benefit is entitled to sue and recover damages. Kardon, 69 F.
Supp. at 513-14. For both early and recent cases citing this formulation, see 5 A. JACOBS,
supra note 4, at § 8.02 n. 1. A second plausible basis for the private right of action has been
found in § 29(b) of the Exchange Act, which declares void any contract in violation of the
Act or its rules. See Blue Cho Stamps, 421 U.S. at 735. For a complete discussion of cases
applying this theory, see 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 8.02[b], § 8.02[b0] n.4. A third basis
of a rule lob-5 implied right of action is the statutory implication theory. See Borak, 377
U.S. at 431-32; 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 8.02[c), 1-207 ("the essence of the [statutory
implication theory] is that the underlying bases of the Exchange Act plus a general grant of
jurisdiction to the courts are sufficient to create an implied private right of action"). The
Supreme Court has favored an approach that emphasizes congressional intent. See Touche
Ross, 442 U.S. at 578. In view of the scant legislative and administrative history of § 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, the Court, in determining congressional intent, has held that congressional
acquiesence in the cumulative nature of§ 10(b) and rule lob-5 thereunder amounts to ratifi-
cation of the implied private right of action. See Huddeston, 103 S. Ct. at 689.
In recent cases, however, the Court has emphasized congressional intent when deciding
whether to imply a private right of action. See Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. at 689; Touche Ross,
442 U.S. at 578. In Huddeston, the Court held that the availability of an express remedy
under § 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976), does not preclude an action under
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 103 S. Ct. at 690. In support of its holding, the Court took cogni-
zance of the fact that when Congress substantially revised the securities laws in 1975, most
federal courts permitted suit under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 regardless of the availability of
other express remedies and concluded that "Congress' decision to leave Section 10(b) intact
suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the Section 10(b) action." Id at
4102 (citing Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982) and Lorilard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81
(1978)).
12. Ross v. A. H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 556 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980). In Blue Ch#? Stamps, the Court noted that flexible judicial interpretation of the
rule lob-5 private right of action has caused the rule to become "a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn." 421 U.S. at 737. However, the Court "ex-
press[ed] concern that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiffs who may sue in
this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good," id at 747-48, and held
19831 Liability Under SEC Rule lOb-5
rule 1Ob-5 operates to compensate the victims of securities fraud and to
enhance the rule's prophylactic effect by subjecting those who engage in
proscribed behavior to civil liability.1
3
In delineating the elements of a cause of action under the rule for pri-
vate investors,' 4 courts have borrowed aspects of the closely analagous
common law action for deceit.15 Materiality,' 6 reliance,' 7 and causation 8
are three elements of a rule lOb-5 cause of action that have a common law
that only actual purchasers or sellers of securities have rule lOb-5 standing. Id at 747. In
doing so, the Court explicitly precluded recovery by those who would have purchased or
sold as a result of actions in violation of the rule. Id at 734-35. The Court justified its
restrictive reading by stating that, when construing rule lOb-5, "[they] are dealing with a
private cause of action which has been judicially found to exist, and which will have to be
judicially delimited one way or another unless or until Congress addresses the question."
Id at 748-49. Blue Chp Stamps was the first in a series of Supreme Court decisions limiting
the scope of rule lOb-5. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980) (duty to
disclose nonpublic information when trading in securities does not arise simply by virtue of
the act of trading securities while in possession of nonpublic information but may arise from
an agency or fiduciary relationship with the issuer of securities in criminal actions pursuant
to rule lOb-5); Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 472-80 (mere breach of fiduciary duty is not
"deceptive" or "manipulative" within the meaning of § 10(b) or rule l0b-5 when there is an
appropriate remedy in state law); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193, 212-15 (scienter required in
rule lOb-5 actions; no action for mere negligence); cf. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560 (no private
right of action under § 17(a) of Exchange Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)
(no private right of action under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act for unsuccessful tender of-
feror).
Two recent decisions may, however, signal an end to the Court's restrictive reading of rule
lOb-5 and other provisions of the securities laws. See Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. at 690 (availa-
bility of express remedy under § 11 of the Securities Act does not preclude a private action
under rule l0b-5); Curran, 102 S. Ct. at 1825 (implied private right of action for violation of
the Commodities Exchange Act).
13. One reason advanced for the existence of the rule lob-5 private right of action is so
that private plaintiffs may supplement the Commission's authority to enforce the rule. See
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
14. For the elements of a rule lOb-5 cause of action, see supra note 10.
15. The hornbook elements of an action for fraud are: (1) false misrepresentation by
the defendant; (2) knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is
false, or the defendant's lack of a sufficient basis of information to make the representation;
(3) an intention by the defendant to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in
reliance on the misrepresentation; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff in acting or re-
fraining from acting; and (5) damage due to such reliance. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). Reliance was necessary to provide the causal
link. Id § 108, at 714.
The elements of a cause of action under rule lOb-5 are not identical to the elements of a
common law fraud action. In fact, rule l0b-5 has been the basis of liability in several situa-
tions where common law fraud theory would otherwise have been insufficient. See Huddle-
ston, 103 S. Ct. at 691; Mfra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
16. Clause (b) of the rule makes it unlawful to misstate material facts or to fail to dis-
close material facts that render a statement misleading. See supra note 1. Although clauses
(a) and (c) do not specifically mention the term "material," the materiality requirement has..
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basis. At common law and in early rule lOb-5 actions, proof of these three
conceptually distinct but interrelated elements was a prerequisite to recov-
ery.' 9 Traditionally, this meant that a plaintiff had to prove (1) direct reli-
been read into actions brought under those clauses that involve misrepresentations and
omissions. See Affiliated Ule Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
In TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), a case brought for violation of
§ 14(a) of the 1934 Act,.the Court held that "[an omitted fact is material if there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote." Id at 449 (emphasis added). The TSC opinion suggests that this formulation
of materiality governs rule lOb-5 actions. Id at 445-46 n.3, 447 n.9. It has been so inter-
preted by several courts. SEC v. Mize, 615 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1980); Zweig v. Hearst
Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31,
35 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978). See also 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 61.02[b][ii], 3-115 n.40. See
generally 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 62.
17. In a common law action for deceit, proof of direct reliance was a prerequisite to
recovery. Establishing reliance involves a dual inquiry: (1) did plaintiff believe defendant?;
and (2) did plaintiff act upon that belief by purchasing or selling securities? See Wilson v.
Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981); R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, supra note 5, at 1047.
Under rule 1Ob-5, however, direct reliance on misrepresentations is only required when a
complaint alleges an affirmative misrepresentation of fact in a face-to-face transaction. See
infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. In actions involving complete nondisclosure
where there is a duty to disclose facts, reliance is no longer necessary. See Affiliated Ute
Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153-54. See also infra notes 65-92 and accompanying text. In cases
where the alleged fraud is a misrepresentation or omission of material fact, reliance may be
presumed. See infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text. When there is fraud in violation
of any of the provisions of rule lOb-5, and that fraud affects the autonomy of the market in
generating accurate information about the intrinsic value of securities, then indirect reliance
on the fraud is sufficient for the purposes of establishing a rule 10b-5 claim if the allegedly
defrauded investor relies on the integrity of the market in disseminating information when
making a losing purchase or sale of securities. See infra notes 114-84 and accompanying
text.
In determining the degree of reliance required, the Second Circuit has applied a "substan-
tial factor" test, holding that the fraud does not need to be the sole cause of the purchase or
sale, but only a "significant contributing cause." Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982), vacated and remanded with instruction to dismiss
with prejudice, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1983); Wilson, 648 F.2d at 92; Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krek-
stein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1976).
Professor Jacobs refers to three types of reliance that may be required in a rule lob-5
action: "constructive reliance," "actual reliance," and "reasonable reliance." "Constructive
reliance" refers to reliance that has been presumed. "Actual reliance" is reliance that is
either direct or indirect. Reliance on misrepresentations or omissions is "reasonable" when
the fraud is material. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 64.02[b][iJ-[iii]
18. In Affiliated Ute Citizens, the Court found that the causal relationship that must
exist is that of causation in fact. 406 U.S. at 154. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970) (proxy rules case); see infra note 72 for a discussion of causation.
Affiliated Ute Citizens did not, however, decide how close that relationship must be. Some
courts have applied the principles of proximate cause and foreseeable injury. See, e.g., Hud-
dleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1974), arfd, 103 S. Ct. 683
(1983); see generally, 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 64.02.
19. The courts measure materiality by objective standards, and in each case determine
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ance on (2) a material misrepresentation and (3) a causal nexus between
the misrepresentation and (4) the injury.20 While courts continue to re-
quire proof of materiality and causation, direct reliance on misrepresenta-
tions is currently considered inappropriate in the context of most actions
brought pursuant to the rule.2" As a result of this departure from the com-
mon law reliance requirement, the neat distinctions traditionally main-
tained between the concepts of reliance, materiality and causation have
broken down.
22
The departure from common law notions of reliance in rule lOb-5 ac-
tions may be attributed to fundamental differences between the prophylac-
tic purpose behind the rule and the limited nature of protection provided
by an action for common law fraud.23 An action for common law deceit is
available only when there has been an affirmative misstatement of fact in a
face-to-face transaction.24 Rule lOb-5, on the other hand, provides far
whether a reasonable person would act on the basis of a particular misrepresentation or
omission. See TSC, 426 U.S. at 449; see also supra note 16. Reliance, on the other hand,
involves a subjective inquiry, where the issue is whether the particular investor believed and
acted upon the misrepresentations. See Wilson, 648 F.2d at 92 n.6; R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, supra note 5, at 1047. Although reliance is considered part of causation, see Huddle-
ston, 640 F.2d at 547; 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 64.01[b][ii] n.6 and cases cited
therein, the two concepts involve different analyses. Causation focuses on the connection
between the defendant's fraud and the plaintiffs loss, see Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th
Cir. 1981), appealpending, 102 S. Ct. 1424 (1982); Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heidler & Co., 578
F.2d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 1978); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), whereas reliance concerns the relationship be-
tween the fraud and the purchase or sale, see, e.g., Schlick, 507 F.2d at 380-81. See also 5A
A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 64.02.
20. See supra note 15.
21. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153-54; see supra notes 16 & 18.
Reliance is no longer necessary in actions involving complete nondisclosure brought pur-
suant to rule lOb-5(a) or (c). Affdiated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153-54. See also infra notes
65-92 and accompanying text. Reliance may be presumed in cases involving misstatement
or omission of material facts in violation of rule 10b-5(b). See, e.g., Shores v. Sklar, 647
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1983); see also infra
notes 93-113 and accompanying text. When fraud, be it a misstatement, omission or nondis-
closure of material information, affects the accuracy of information generated in the securi-
ties market, reliance on the integrity of the market in producing information may be an
essential element of a rule lob-5 cause of action. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). See infra note 19.
22. See 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 66.01(a) n.8; see supra notes 16-19 and accom-
panying text. See also, Stoll, Reliance as an Element in 10b-5 Actions, 53 OR. L. REV. 169
(1974).
23. See Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. at 691 (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 744-45 ("the
typical fact situation in which the classic tort of. . .deceit evolved was light years away
from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule lob-5 is applicable"). 5 A. JA-
COBS, supra note 4, §§ 2.00-2.05; 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1435 (2d ed. 1961).
24. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at § 2, 1-6 ("[pre 1942 common law sometimes
permitted recovery by a plaintiff who bought or sold stock on the basis of a misrepresenta-
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more protection against fraudulent practices than the common law action
of deceit. Clause (b) of the rule proscribes the use of both untrue state-
ments of material fact and material omissions of information that render
an otherwise accurate statement misleading.25 Furthermore, clauses (a)
and (c), prohibiting participation in fraudulent schemes or courses of con-
duct, bring circumstances involving complete nondisclosure within the
purview of the rule.26 In a rule lOb-5 action where the alleged fraud con-
sists of fraudulent omissions or nondisclosures, actual reliance is difficult,
if not impossible, to prove.27
The broad antifraud provisions of rule l0b-5 compensate for the com-
mon law deficiencies by expanding the scope of unlawful behavior,
thereby raising the standards of conduct in the industry.28 The rule thus
provides an incentive to comply with the disclosure mandates of the secur-
ities laws. If corporate issuers of securities fully disclose accurate informa-
tion, the price of the stock should reflect this information. Hence, the price
of a given security should be an indication of its intrinsic value.2 9 If, how-
ever, fraudulent information or perceptions about an issuer of securities
enters the market, then the price of that issuer's security may become artifi-
cially inflated or deflated and no longer represent the intrinsic value of the
tion"). In an action for concealment of facts, there was no common law cause of action
except in those jurisdictions that imposed upon corporate insiders a duty to reveal material
facts in face-to-face transactions with shareholders. See Note, SEC Rule lOb-5 A Recent
Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 860, 879-81 (1972); 5 A. JAcOBS, supra note 4, at § 2.01(b);
cf Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
25. For the full text of rule lOb-5, see supra note 1. As used in this Note, the term
"omission" refers to what one commentator labels a "half-truth." See 5A A. JACOBS, supra
note 4, at § 61.01(a) n.9 ("[a] half truth is a statement which accurately discloses some facts,
but misleads the listener or reader by concealing other data necessary for a true understand-
ing"). A misrepresentation or misstatement as used in this Note refers to an outright lie.
Nondisclosures refer to situations involving complete silence.
26. For the full text of rule lOb-5, see supra note 1. Complete nondisclosure is actiona-
ble when there is a duty to reveal information. See in/ra notes 36 & 72 and accompanying
text; see also 5A A. JAcoBs, supra note 4, at § 61.01(a) n.14. It should be noted that misrep-
resentations and omissions as well as nondisclosures may form the basis of a violation of
rule lOb-5(a) or (c). See, e.g., Competitive Assoc. v. Laventhal, 516 F.2d 881, 814 (2d Cir.
1976) (omissions and misrepresentations are part of a scheme to defraud).
27. See 3 A. BROMBERO & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 8.6(1), at 209 (1980) ("in nondisclosure cases reliance has little if any rational
role"); see also Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir.
1981); Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1978); Note, The
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb.5, 88 HARV. L. REv. 584, 590
(1975).
28. See Affdiated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151; see also supra note 4.
29. See Note, supra note 5, at 1089-90: "The efficient capital market hypothesis asserts
that all available, relevent information about a company's financial prospects is fully and
virtually instantaneously reflected in the market price of the company's securities."
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underlying security.3" Thus when fraud has manipulated the price of
stock, a purchaser or seller who relies on the price of stock as an indication
of its value may incur a loss, even if that investor has not directly relied on
any misrepresentations.
3 1
Responding to the unique nature of securities fraud and the prophylac-
tic purpose of rule lOb-5, courts have either modified or eliminated the
reliance requirement when the factual context of the action renders proof
of reliance an onerous evidentiary burden.32 Case law indicates that tradi-
tional common law reliance is required only when the complaint alleges a
misstatement of fact in a face-to-face transaction, bringing the action
within the parameters of a common law action for deceit.33 Because reli-
ance is considered part of causation,34 the recent alterations in the reliance
requirement have made it difficult for courts to determine how causation
may be established when there is no proof of actual reliance and whether
an affirmative showing of nonreliance defeats an action brought pursuant
to the rule.
In cases involving complete nondisclosure implicating clauses (a) or (c)
of the rule, and in cases of deceptive omissions within the purview of
clause (b), courts have used an "objective approach" to liability whereby
the materiality of nondisclosure or omission may establish causation.35
This specific inquiry under this objective approach depends, however,
upon whether the alleged fraud is a nondisclosure or omission. In com-
plete nondisclosure cases, causation may be established when there is a
duty to disclose and a withholding of material facts. 36 In deceptive omis-
sion cases, reliance may bepresumed upon a showing of a failure to reveal
material facts. Once reliance is presumed, causation is circumstantially es-
30. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976) (the price of stock may also reflect misrepresentations); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88
F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (the market price of stock will reflect all available infor-
mation, including misrepresentations).
31. See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907.
32. See supra note 21.
33. Common law deceit is available only when there is an affirmative misrepresentation
of fact in a face-to-face transaction. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
34. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 547 (5th Cir. 1979), affid, 103 S.
Ct. 683 (1983). See also supra notes 15 and 19.
35. The approach is objective in that the materiality of concealed facts, tested by a
standard of reasonableness, establishes causation. See Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at
153-54; Mills, 396 U.S. at 385. See also infra note 72 and accompanying text.
36. See Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153-54 (in cases involving primarily a failure
to disclose material facts coupled with a duty to disclose, causation in fact has been estab-
lished). See also Mills, 396 U.S. at 385 (material omission in proxy statement). See infra
note 72 and accompanying text.
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tablished." In most cases, the defendant may rebut the inference of causa-
tion by proving nonreliance. 38  Thus, recovery under this objective
approach may depend upon a characterization of the fraud as a material
nondisclosure or omission.39
A second approach to reliance and causation has developed in the lower
federal courts whereby an investor may recover for losses incurred in
transactions where fraud has affected the price of the particular security.'
This so-called "fraud-on-the market" theory of liability differs from the
objective approach in that reliance is a prerequisite to recovery. In con-
trast with the common law, however, proof of direct reliance on misstate-
ments is not necessary. Instead, a plaintiff need only allege reliance on the
"integrity of the market" in producing accurate price data.4' In order to
recover damages using a fraud-on-the-market theory, the characterization
of the fraud as an omission or as a nondisclosure is irrelevant.42 Rather,
there must be a showing of fraud that has affected the price of a particular
stock, a purchase or sale in reliance on the integrity of the market price,
and a loss resulting from the purchase or sale.43
In Panzirer v. Wolf," the Second Circuit extended the fraud-on-the-
market theory by holding that an investor who relies on the integrity of the
market in producing information reported in a newspaper has sufficiently
37. See infra note 94 and cases cited therein.
38. See infra note 95 and cases cited therein.
39. See infra note 94 and cases cited therein. But see infra note 95 and cases cited
therein.
40. The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have applied this fraud-on-the-market the-
ory. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S.
Jan. 10, 1983); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976). See also In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Del. 1982); Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,750 (W.D., Okla. 1982); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770 (E.D.
Pa. 1981); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Kline v. Wolff, 88 F.R.D.
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Greenspan v. Brassler, 78
F.R.D. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 480-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reliance on the integrity of the regulatory process).
41. See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907-08.
42. Id Thus, there is some overlap between the fraud-on-the-market theory of recov-
ery and the objective approach to liability in actions involving omissions or nondisclosure
affecting the market. In these cases a plaintiff may proceed under either theory. Id at 906.
43. Id at 908.
44. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,251 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16,
1980), on reargument, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,363
(S.D.N.Y. April 21, 1980), affd in part and rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982), vacated as moot and remanded with instructions to dismiss
with prejudice mem., 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982).
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alleged causation for the purposes of withstanding a motion for summary
judgment.45 In Panzirer, defendant Allied Artist issued an annual report
containing numerous misrepresentations and omissions that had been cer-
tified by defendant Price Waterhouse. Zelda Panzirer, who never read the
annual report, purchased Allied's stock after reading about the company in
the Wall Street Journal column, "Heard on the Street." Six months later,
Allied filed for bankruptcy and Panzirer lost her investment. Panzirer filed
a class suit under rule lOb-5 against defendants Allied Artist and Price
Waterhouse, contending that if the Wall Street Journal article had
presented Allied in a less favorable light, she would not have made her
losing investment. Panzirer asserted that her reliance on the newspaper
article amounted to reliance on the integrity of the market.'
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding
that Panzirer primarily relied on the Wall Street Journal column and
placed only secondary reliance on the integrity of the market.47 The dis-
trict court held that such secondary reliance would not support a rule lOb-
5 claim.48
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on
the issue of reliance.49 Finding no legal basis for the district court's dis-
tinction between primary and secondary reliance, the court of appeals
stated that direct reliance on misrepresentations or omissions is not neces-
sary to establish causation. ° In an opinion by Circuit Judge Lumbard, the
court held that a causational link is sufficiently alleged when a rule lOb-5
plaintiff indirectly relies on the misrepresentation or omission by relying
45. 663 F.2d at 367.
46. Id
47. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,363 at 97,436.
48. Id The district court also denied Panzirer's motion for class certification on the
grounds that she was not a suitable class representative, having asserted no less than three
different accounts of the facts precipitating her purchase of stock. Id at 97,432-37. In a
deposition taken by defendants on Nov. 6, 1979, Panzirer claimed that she did not see the
annual report and received no other financial information. Rather, she claimed that she
bought Allied's stock on the basis of the newspaper article and her conversation with her
broker who told her that he kpew of "no negative news about Allied." Id at 97,431. Ac-
cording to Panzirer's second account of the facts culminating with her purchase, she asserted
that her broker read to her from the Standard & Poor tear sheet during their telephone
conversation. Id at 97,432. Her broker testified, however, that the information he read to
her from the tear sheet pertained to the video cassette business and that he did not read any
financial information about Allied. In her last version of the facts, Panzirer claimed that her
broker read about the video business and conveyed information about Allied's earnings,
stock price and financial condition. Id at 97,437. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's denial of lass certification. 663 F.2d at 368.
49. 663 F.2d at 367.
50. d at 368.
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on information from those working in or reporting on the securities mar-
kets, when that information is reported after the material misrepresenta-
tion or omission has been circulated.5
Both Price Waterhouse and Panzirer appealed the Second Circuit's deci-
sion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a rule 1Ob-5
defendant, who has made an allegedly misleading statement relating to an
issuer of corporate securities, can be liable to an individual who purchases
the issuer's stock in reliance on a newspaper article that refers to the issuer
but not to the defendant or the defendant's statements. 52 The Court, how-
ever, denied Panzirer's petition for certiorari on the class action issue. Hav-
ing lost all possibility of class certification, Panzirer decided not to pursue
her claim and petitioned the Court to dismiss her case as moot. As a re-
sult, the Court ordered the Second Circuit to dismiss the case with
prejudice.
This Note first examines the objective approach used to establish causa-
tion without requiring proof of direct reliance on misrepresentations. It
then discusses the development of and rationale behind the fraud-on-the-
market theory and analyzes Panzirer's extension of this theory of recovery.
Finally, this Note concludes by exploring the potential ramifications of the
Supreme Court's decision to dismiss Panzirer with prejudice.
I. THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO RULE 10B-5 LIABILITY
A. The Origins of the Objective Approach
In rule lOb-5 actions where the alleged fraud is either an omission or
complete nondisclosure of material facts, requiring proof of reliance would
preclude civil recovery and thereby thwart the rule's deterrent effect.
54
Courts began to modify the reliance requirement in the 1960's to relieve an
allegedly defrauded investor of the burden of proving direct reliance on a
defendant's silence. Thus, in omission or nondisclosure cases, a plaintiff
could satisfy the element of reliance by showing that he would have acted
differently had all the material facts been disclosed. 5
This method of establishing reliance was first used by the Second Circuit
51. Id at 367.
52. 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982).
53. 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982).
54. See supra notes'24-31 and accompanying text.
55. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); see also Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 n.9 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
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in List v. Fashion Park, Inc. 56 In List, a seller of securities brought a rule
lOb-5 action against a corporate officer, alleging that the officer failed to
disclose material inside information when purchasing the securities." The
district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because the inves-
tor had not shown actual reliance on the officer's silence and therefore
could not establish causation."8
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of nonreliance 59
but stated that the proper test of reliance in nondisclosure cases was not
whether the plaintiff relied on the defendant's silence but whether the
plaintiff would have acted differently if fully informed.' The court held
against recovery, even though the nondisclosure was material, because the
plaintiff had failed to meet this test of reliance.6 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court distinguished between the common law elements of reliance
and materiality, noting that while materiality certifies whether the reliance
was reasonable, reliance provides the causal link between the fraud and
the injury.62 Although the court admitted that discarding the reliance re-
quirement would facilitate proof of fraud and thus advance the purposes
of the rule, it found this to be "an inadequate reason for reading out of the
rule so basic an element of tort law as the principle of cause in fact."63
Although the List formulation of reliance is easier to show than com-
mon law reliance, it imposes upon a plaintiff the burden of proving a hy-
pothetical course of conduct." The deficiencies in the List test were,
however, eliminated in the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute Citi-
56.- 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
57. 340 F.2d at 460-61. One who is privy to nonpublic information by virtue of an
agency relationship to a corporate issuer of securities and knows that the material is nonpub-
lic has a duty to refrain from trading, tipping, or recommending the issuer's securities or to
disclose that information prior to trading in the securities of the corporation. See Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980); see also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co,, 401
F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); cf. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961). Tippees, those who receive material nonpublic information from corpo-
rate insiders, have a duty not to trade when they know or should know that the information
is material nonpublic information that came from an i#sider. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 237-38.
The Supreme Court is currently reexamining the scope of liability in this context. See Dirks
v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982). For an extensive
analysis of insider trading, see 5A A. JAcoBs, supra note 4, at §§ 66.02 & 92.
58. 227 F. Supp. at 911-12.
59. 340 F.2d at 464.
60. Id at 463.
61. Id at 462-63.
62. Id
63. Id at 463.
64. See R. JEnNInos & H. MARSH, supra note 5, at 1048, arguing that this test of reli-
ance on omissions is not only hypothetical but also "seems to differ little from the question
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zens v. United States.65
In Affiliated Ute Citizens, a bank and its employees bought stock from a
group of unsophisticated security holders with whom the bank had an
ongoing business relationship. The bank purchased the stock at a price
below market value without disclosing that it was a market maker for the
securities and was reselling the stock to other investors at a substantially
higher price. The Court found that the bank owed the sellers a fiduciary
duty66 that the bank had breached by failing to disclose material informa-
tion concerning its activity as a market maker for the stock.67
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had held that
the plaintiffs could not recover damages under rule 1Ob-5 because they
failed to show reliance on material misstatements.6 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected this restrictive reading of the rule. The Court distin-
guished between the prohibition against false or misleading statements in
clause (b) of the rule and the broader proscriptions in clauses (a) and (c).69
Finding that the defendants' behavior could be characterized as a decep-
tive scheme or course of business actionable under clauses (a) or (c), the
Court concluded that the lower court's requirement of actual reliance was
misplaced.70
Noting that "Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the
purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed 'not technically and restric-
tively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes,' ,71 the Court held
that:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite
to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be
material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have con-
sidered them important in the making of this decision. . . . This
obligation to disclosi and this withholding of a material fact es-
tablish the requisite element of causation in fact.72
There are several ambiguities in the Affiliated Ute Citizens holding
of materiality, i.e., would (might?) a 'reasonable person' or the 'average investor' have con-
sidered the information important?"
65. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
66. Id at 153.
67. Id
68. Reyos v. United States, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,693 (10th Cir. 1970).
69. 406 U.S. at 152-53.
70. Id at 153.
71. Id at 151.
72. Id at 153-54 (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-light Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) and
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which made the decision difficult for the lower federal courts to apply.
First, although the Court found the defendants' activity to be primarily a
failure to disclose-within the proscriptions of rule lOb-5(a) and (c), 73 the
case also involved misrepresentations and omissions.' 4 While it is possible
that the Court's holding is restricted to actions involving complete nondis-
closure, lower courts have applied.Affiliated Ute Citizens in actions brought
pursuant to rule lOb-5(b) for omissions and misrepresentations.75 Another
curious aspect of the Affiliated Ute Citizens holding is the Court's failure to
remand the issue of causation to the lower court, indicating that material-
ity conclusively establishes causation in nondisclosure cases. 76 Courts that
have extended Affiliated Ue Citizens to actions involving misrepresenta-
tions and omissions in violation of rule l0b-5(b) have held that materiality
establishes a "rebuttable presumption of reliance. 77 Finally, although Af-
filiated Ute Citizens involved a face-to-face transaction, courts have uni-
versally extended its coverage to exchange and over-the-counter
transactions ("open market" transactions).78
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. deniedsub nom., Coates v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1979)).
Both Affiliated Ute Citizens and Mills employ a "might" formulation of materiality. Affili-
ated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153-54; Mills, 396 U.S. at 385. Compare, TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976) (an omitted fact is material if a reasonable investor
"would" consider the information important when making an investment decision), dis-
cussed supra at note 16. That the TSC opinion did not, however, overrule the Affiliate Ute
Citizens or Mills formulation of materiality suggests that TSC controls in determining
whether a fact is material, whereas the Affiliated Ute Citizens/Mills test is used for determin-
ing whether a material omission was the cause-in-fact of a plaintiff's injury.
73. 406 U.S. at 151-52.
74. Id at 152.
75. Eg., Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Affiliated Ute Citizens creates a
presumption of reliance on alleged material omissions); cases cited infra notes 94 & 95; see
also Bell v. Cameron, 669 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1982) (Affliated Ute Citizens creates aipre-
sumption of reliance in cases involving both material misrepresentations and omissions).
76. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 399-400 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (concurring and dissenting opinion); see also 5A A. JACOBS,
supra note 4, at § 64.02 n.13 and cases cited therein; accord, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970) (proxy rules case).
77. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982) (reliance presumed in case involving both misrepresentations and
omissions); Ri'kin, 574 F.2d at 263 (reliance presumed in omissions cases). For a full discus-
sion of extensions of Affiliated Ute Citizens in actions brought for violations of rule lOb-5(b),
see infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238,
240 (2d Cir. 1974). This construction of Affiliated Ute Citizens is in accord with Mills, 396
U.S. at 385 (proxy rules case involving a class action).
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B. Extensions of Affiliated Ute Citizens
L Nondisclosure Cases in Open Market Transactions
Courts have extended Affiliated Ute Citizens to situations where the al-
leged fraud involves violations of rule lOb-5(a) or (c), proscribing fraudu-
lent schemes or conduct not involving a face-to-face transaction."' The
Second Circuit has found the Affiliated Ute Citizens rationale dispositive
when there has been a fraudulent scheme resulting in a forced sale of se-
curities at a price below market value.80 In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp. ,1 the defendant, Penn-Dixie, acquired voting control of Continen-
tal Corporation. The plaintiff, a minority shareholder in Continental, al-
leged that the defendant used Continental's assets so as to enhance the
value of Penn-Dixie's stock and depress the value of Continental's. The
plaintiff further alleged that Penn-Dixie issued proxy statements contain-
ing material omissions as to the manner in which Penn-Dixie had reduced
the value of Continental's shares as part of a plan to obtain a favorable
exchange ratio when the companies merged.82 The district court dismissed
the minority shareholders' suit for damages resulting from the unfairly low
exchange ratio.8 3 The court reasoned that because Penn-Dixie, as Conti-
nental's majority shareholder, had enough voting power to force a merger
between the companies, the defendant's misleading proxy reports could
not have caused the plaintiffs to engage in any investment decision."
The Second Circuit reversed on the issue of causation. Relying onAffili-
ated Ute Citizens, the court reasoned that if the case were based solely on
misrepresentations and omissions in the proxy statement, then the plaintiff
would have to show "both loss causation-that the misrepresentations or
omissions caused the economic harm-and transaction causation--that the
violations in question caused the [plaintiff] to engage in the [particular]
transaction."85 In order to prove transaction causation a plaintiff must
79. See supra note 78.
80. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 976 (1975).
81. Id
82. Id at 376-77.
83. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., No. 73, Civ. 1467 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1973).
84. Id Under Indiana law, a majority vote of the outstanding shares of stock of a
corporation will secure shareholder approval of a merger. IND. CODE ANN. tit. 23, art. I, ch.
5, § 2(b) (Bums 1972). Since Penn-Dixie could legally force Continental's minority share-
holders to forfeit ownership rights, the lower court determined that the misleading proxy
statement did not cause plaintiffs' sale. The district court concluded that plaintiffs' inability
to establish a causal connection between the fraud and the transaction defeated their rule
lOb-5 claim because they failed to prove the element of reliance. Id
85. 507 F.2d at 380 (emphasis supplied).
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have relied on misrepresentations or omissions. The court held that where
the alleged fraud involves the effectuation of a scheme to defraud, includ-
ing not only misrepresentations and omissions but also market manipula-
tion and a merger on preferential terms, a plaintiff need only show loss
causation in order to recover.
8 6
The Second Circuit has suggested that this theory may apply when there
is a scheme to defraud but no forced sale. In Competitive Associates v.
Laventhal, 7 the Second Circuit interpreted Schlick as holding that "reli-
ance is not required where a comprehensive scheme to defraud which in-
cludes not only omissions and misrepresentation, but substantial collateral
conduct as well, is alleged." ' In Competitive Associates, an investment
manager allegedly mishandled the plaintiffs' funds. The investment man-
ager had previously mismanaged other funds but had covered up his activ-
ities by allegedly falsifying financial statements that the defendant
accountants had certified. The plaintiff brought a rule lOb-5 action alleg-
ing that the accountants certified the statements as part of a scheme to
attract investors to the investment management company by inflating the
reputation of the investment manager, thereby creating a "dumping
ground" for the securities he was manipulating.8 9 The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendant accountants because the
plaintiff never saw the misleading reports, and therefore, in the court's
view, could not have relied on them.
90
The Second Circuit reversed, stating that a plaintiff need only show cau-
sation in fact when, as in Schlick, "both misrepresentations and omissions
are alleged to be only one aspect of an elaborate scheme to defraud."9'
The court reasoned that the fact that the plaintiff never saw the annual
reports is inapposite to the issue of causation because under a Schlick-Affil-
iated Ute Citizens analysis the plaintiff need not prove transaction causa-
tion, but only that the fraud caused the alleged loss.92
2 Extensions of Affiliated Ute Citizens to Cases Involving Omissions
Although Affiliated Ute Citizens involved "primarily a failure to dis-
close" material facts,93 it has been applied in omission cases arising under
86. Id at 381.
87. 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975).
88. Id at 814.
89. Id at 812-13.
90. Id at 813.
91. Id at 814.
92. See supra notes 76, 85-86 and accompanying text.
93. 406 U.S. at 153-54. Nondisclosures are distinguishable from omissions. Nondisclo-
sure cases involve complete silence, whereas omission cases involve a statement accurately
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rule lOb-5(b). 9 ' In order to limit recovery to those situations where a vio-
lation of the rule is the cause in fact of the injury, courts have interpreted
Affiliated Ute Citizens as establishing a rebuttable presumption of reliance
on the alleged omissions.9" The Fifth Circuit's decision in R/kin v. Crow
9 6
illustrates this interpretation of Affiliated Ute Citizens. In Rifkin, plaintiff
brought a rule lOb-5 class action against Recognition Equipment, Inc.,
seeking recovery of damages allegedly caused by annual and interim re-
ports containing misrepresentations and omissions as to the company's
financial condition. The plaintiff argued that these misrepresentations and
omissions inflated the price of the stock, and that class members purchas-
ing stock at the inflated value incurred a loss when the company's true
financial condition was disclosed.97 Granting the defendants' motion to
dismiss, the district court found that plaintiffs never saw the annual report
containing the misrepresentations and omissions and thus could not have
relied on them.98
The Fifth Circuit remanded the case on the issue of reliance.99 The
court stated that if the district court finds that this is a misrepresentation
case, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving reliance on the misleading
reports."i° If, however, the district court finds that the fraud may be
"characterized" as an "omission," then the plaintiff is entitled to the Affili-
ated Ute Citizens presumption of reliance that the defendants carry the
burden of disproving.'
disclosing some information but misleading the listener or reader by concealing other infor-
mation. See supra note 25.
94. See, e.g., Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978); Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider
& Co., 578 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1978); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). But see infra note 95 and cases cited therein (presumption of
reliance in cases involving both omissions and misrepresentations).
95. See cases cited supra note 94. See also Bell v. Cameron, 669 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.
1982); Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 178 n.21 (8th Cir. 1982); Sharp v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 1981); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1983); Panter v. Marshal Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,
284 (7th Cir. 1981); Carothers v. Rice, 663 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980); Titan Group, Inc. v.
Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975); Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1975).
In Affiliated Ute Citizens, the Court held that a materiality of nondisclosure established
causation, 406 U.S. at 151-52; see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
96. 874 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978).
97. Id at 258-60.
98. Id at 260-61.
99. Id at 262.
100. Id at 263.
101. Id District Judge Taylor determined, on remand, that it would be impossible to
make a sound investment decision after reading a financial statement containing material
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3. Extension of Affiliated Ute Citizens Whenever Reliance is Dicult
to Prove
Several circuits have interpreted Affiliated Ute Citizens as establishing a
rebuttable presumption of reliance when there has been a general assertion
that may be viewed as a misrepresentation or omission.' °2 The Third Cir-
cuit's decision in Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand'0 3 exemplifies this approach.
In Sharp, purchasers of limited partnership interests in an oil and gas drill-
ing venture brought a class action suit against an accounting firm that had
prepared an opinion letter dealing with the tax treatment of the invest-
ments. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's opinion letter contained
numerous misrepresentations and omissions in violation of rule lOb-5, that
the opinion letter caused them to invest in the venture, and that they lost
their investment when events did not proceed as represented in the
letter. 104
Defendant appealed the judgment for the plaintiff, arguing that the trial
court erred in creating a presumption that the class representative relied on
the misrepresentations and omissions in the opinion letter."°5 The defend-
ant contended that because this was a misrepresentation case, the plaintiff
carried the burden of proving reliance." 6-The Third Circuit rejected a
strict application of the omissions-misrepresentations dichotomy, however,
and embraced the position that reliance should be presumed "when it is
logical to do so."' 0" The court thus adopted a more flexible approach to
reliance, requiring determination of "the most reasonable placement of the
burden of reliance" on a case-by-case basis.'0 8 The court concluded that
distinguishing between misrepresentations and omissions in the case at
hand would be illogical because it would require a dual jury instruction."°
omissions or misrepresentations and permitted plaintiff to proceed with his motion to certify
the class. 80 F.R.D. 285 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
102. See, e.g., Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982);
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 178 n.21 (8th Cir. 1982); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,
649 F.2d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 935 (1982); Shores v. Sklar 647 F.2d
462, 472 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1983); Carothers v.
Rice, 633 F.2d 7, 14 (6th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 1702 (1981); Titan Group v.
Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975); Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1975).
103. 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981); cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1427 (1982).
104. Id at 178-79.
105. Id at 187.
106. Id
107. Id at 188 (quoting Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 951 (1980)).
108. Id at 188.
109. Id Judge Aldisert stated: "The jury would be instructed to search for proof of
reliance by the plaintiff with regard to misrepresentations, and to search for proof of nonreli-
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As the Sharp decision indicates, courts have interpreted the rule lOb-5
reliance requirement flexibly. Courts have extended Affi/iated Ute Citizens
to open market transactions involving nondisclosures,"° omissions,"I and
complex combinations of misrepresentations and omissions." 2 To restrict
the potentially limitless liability under the rule, however, courts have per-
mitted a defendant to prove that the deceptive misrepresentations or omis-
sions did not in fact induce the plaintiff to enter into the allegedly injurious
transaction.' 13
II. THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY OF RECOVERY
A fraud-on-the-market theory of liability has developed in the lower
federal courts allowing an investor who purchases or sells securities under
the assumption that the market is free from fraud to recover losses result-
ing from rule 1Ob-5 violations that have caused the market to generate
inaccurate information about the particular security." 4 The fraud-on-the-
market theory was first used in cases involving fraud that had inflated the
price of a security, and an unsuspecting investor had bought the security
after relying on the price of the particular security as an indication of its
inherent value. Once the truth about the issuer became public and the
price of its securities decreased, these investors suffered a loss, even if they
never saw or heard the fraudulent remarks made by or on behalf of the
issuer. 115
Recognizing that these investors had incurred damage as a result of a
rule lOb-5 violation, some courts have held that investors who purchased
or sold securities in reliance on the integrity of the market price, after ma-
terial misrepresentations or omissions inflated or deflated the price of the
securities, have circumstantially established causation." 6 This theory as-
sumes that reliance on market price amounts to indirect reliance on the
representations underlying that price."'
Recently, the fraud-on-the-market theory has been extended for the
ance by the defendant with regard to the omissions. The problems with such a complicated
approach before a lay jury are legion." Id
110. See spra notes 79-92 and accompanying text
111. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text; supra note 95 and cases cited
therein.
112. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 102 and cases cited therein.
114. See supra note 40 and cases cited therein.
115. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976); see also infra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
117. See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907.
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benefit of investors who rely on the integrity of the market in bringing into
the market securities that are entitled to be issued.1 8 The most expansive
reading of the fraud-on-the-market theory to date allows an investor who
relies on the integrity of the market in producing information reported in a
newspaper article to recover damages in an action brought pursuant to rule
l0b-5." 9
A4. Development of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
L "Derivative Reliance"
The notion that indirect reliance on material misstatements or omissions
satisfies the reliance element in rule lOb-5 actions predates both the objec-
tive and "fraud-on-the-market" theories of recovery. "Derivative" reli-
ance, or reliance on others who have relied, has been recognized as a valid
form of reliance in actions involving forced sales of securities.'
20
In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co. ,'2 the Second Circuit first articulated
an indirect reliance standard in a rule lOb-5 action. In Vine, a class B
shareholder in Crown Co. was forced to sell his stock pursuant to a short
form merger with Beneficial Financial Company. 22 The seller alleged
that as a result of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated on Crown's class A
shareholders, Beneficial acquired voting control of Crown, effected a
merger, and thereby placed the class B shareholders in the position of a
forced seller.'
23
The Vine court held that proof of reliance is not required in a rule lOb-5
action "when no volitional act is required and the result of a forced sale is
exactly that intended by the wrongdoer."' 24 To establish causation, the
Vine court required only that there be deception that misled class A stock-
holders and that their deception was the cause in fact of the plaintifi's
injury. 125
118. See Shores v. Skiar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3508
(U.S. Jan. 10, 1983), discussed infra notes 152-65 and accompanying text.
119. Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982),
vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss with prejudice, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982).
120. For recent cases using this approach, see 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 4, at
§ 64.01[b][ii] n.68.
121. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
122. A short form merger statute authorizes a corporation owning a high percentage of
the outstanding shares of another corporation to merge the latter corporation into the former
without the authorization of the minority shareholders of the merged corporation.
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In Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. ,126 the Second Circuit extended
the Vine decision to an action involving fraud in connection with the solic-
itation of tender offers. In Crane, an unsuccessful contestant for control of
Air Brake sued its competitor, alleging that the defendant manipulated the
price of Air Brake stock on the open market and made false and mislead-
ing statements to Air Brake shareholders for the purpose of preventing a
merger between the plaintiff and Air Brake. 27 The court reiterated its
position in Vine that proof of direct reliance on misstatements or omissions
is unnecessary where there has been no volitional act, but found that the
defendant's act of concealing material information from the investing pub-
lic caused the price of stock to artificially rise, resulting in the plaintiff's
damage.' 28
2. The Inflated Market Price Theory of Recovery
The Crane court's position that direct reliance on misrepresentations or
omissions is not necessary when the alleged fraud has manipulated the
price of stock was developed further in the 1970's in class actions brought
pursuant to the rule.' 29 Direct subjective reliance, as required by common
law and early rule lOb-5 suits as a prerequisite to causation, presented a
formidable obstacle to the use of the class action device in rule lOb-5 suits.
In order to avoid cumbersome separate trials on the issue of reliance as to
each class member 30 or outright denial of class certification,'13  courts
have focused on the relationship between the fraud and the loss rather
than the connection between the violation and the purchase or sale.'32
126. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), ceri. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
127. Id at 790-97.
128. Id at 797.
129. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); In re Financial Sec. Litig., 64 F.R.D. 443, 450-51 (S.D. Cal. 1974); Davis v. Avco
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 792 (W.D. Ohio 1974); In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 99
(N.D. Cal. 1973); cf. Herbst v. ITT Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1313, (2d Cir. 1974) (class action
for alleged violation of proxy rules); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 362 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1975).
130. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968) (bifurcation of a rule lOb-5
class action ordered, allowing class certification of common question of wrongfulness and
materiality and allowing separate trial on the issue of reliance as to each class member if
common elements of liability are found); cf Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (determination of whether to order separate trials on the issue of reliance is
up to the trial judges).
131. See In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. at 98: "If actual individual reliance in its
common law sense need be proved by each class member, the trial of that issue ... would
tax the courts' (and counsels') resources to an intolerable extent." Thus, individual ques-
tions of reliance would predominate over common issues of wrongfulness and materiality of
misrepresentation, thereby mandating denial of class certification.
132. See cases cited supra note 129.
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In In re Memorex,"' plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification of a
rule lOb-5 action. Defendant argued that the motion should be denied on
the grounds that individual questions of reliance predominated over com-
mon issues.' Finding that a new concept of reliance had developed, free-
ing the court from the overwhelming burden of examining each class
member's subjective intent at the time of the transaction, the court certified
the class.'35 According to the court, this modem concept of reliance
"focuse[s] on a 'causal nexus' between the alleged misstatements and an
inflated price upon which the plaintiffs relied."' 36
B. The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
In Blackie v. Barrack,'37 the Ninth Circuit fully articulated a theory of
liability that both focuses on the causal relationship between the fraud and
an inflated price and seeks to determine whether third persons have di-
rectly relied on alleged misstatements or omissions so as to artificially ma-
nipulate the price of stock.13 The Blackie theory also embodies principles
of the objective theory. The materiality of omitted or misrepresented facts
establishes a presumption that other investors have relied, thereby circum-
stantially establishing a causal relationship between the fraud and the in-
flated market price.'39
In Blackie, defendant issued a series of annual reports misrepresenting
the company's true financial condition. After the defendant made full
public disclosure of the company's unhealthy financial outlook, several
suits were filed against the company for violating the antifraud provisions
of rule lOb-5. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant artificially inflated
the price of the company's stock by its misleading annual and interim re-
ports, press releases, and SEC filings. Upon disclosure of the company's
true financial condition, the value of the stock declined and the plaintiffs
incurred a loss.Y"
In response to the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs could not
recover without proving direct reliance,' 4 ' the Ninth Circuit stated that
133. 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
134. Id. at 97-98.
135. Id at 98-99.
136. Id at 100.
137. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
138. Id at 907; see also cases cited supra note 40.
139. 524 F.2d at 906.
140. Id at 894, 902.
141. Id at 906. Defendants also argued that plaintiffs' motion for class certification be
dismissed, asserting that individual issues of reliance predominated over common questions
of materiality of misrepresentation. Id at 894. Relying on In re Memorex Sec. Cases, 61
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"reliance on particular misrepresentations is unnecessary to establish a
1Ob-5 claim for a deception inflating the price of stock traded in the open
market."' 42 The court held that:
[c]ausation is adequately established in the impersonal stock ex-
change context by proof of purchase and of the materiality of
misrepresentations. . . . Materiality circumstantially establishes
the reliance of some market traders and hence the inflation in the
stock price-when the purchase is made the causational chain be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's loss is suffi-
ciently established to make out a prima facie case.1
43
The court reasoned that investors purchasing securities in the open market
on the basis of favorable price indicia rely on the assumption that the mar-
ket price is validly set and that no fraud has altered the price.'" The inves-
tor thus indirectly relies on the truth of the representations underlying the
stock prices. ' 45 An investor who has no actual knowledge of the misrepre-
sentations or omissions may be injured by the fraud if enough investors
have relied so as to inflate the price of the stock and cause the plaintiff's
losing purchase.1
46
The court noted that, in these circumstances, requiring reliance "im-
pose[s] an unreasonable and irrelevant evidentiary burden . . . [that
would] lead to underinclusive recoveries and thereby threatens the en-
forcement of the securities laws."' 147 Recognizing that rule 1Ob-5 is
designed to foster an expectation that the securities markets are free from
fraud,48 the court refused to leave unprotected those investors who rely on
the integrity of the market in generating price information.
149
F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973) and In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litig., 64 F.R.D. 443 (S.D. Cal.
1974), the court found that individual reliance is not necessary in class actions where fraud
affects the price of securities. 524 F.2d at 906. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying
text. Blackie, however, goes beyond the plaintiffs' rationale for holding direct reliance un-
necessary in these circumstances. See infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
142. 524 F.2d at 906.
143. Id As an alternative holding, the court found that Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S.
128 (1972), would also apply in this case to establish a presumption of reliance because the
fraud can be characterized as a material ommission. 524 F.2d at 905-06; see also supra notes
93-101 and accompanying text. Thus, when a complaint alleges a material omission affect-
ing the price of stock, a plaintiff may proceed by either an Affiliated Ute Citizens theory or a
fraud-on-the-market theory. Id at 905-06; accord Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
144. 524 F.2d at 907.
145. Id
146. Id
147. Id at 907-08.
148. Id at 907.
149. Id
[Vol. 32:695
Liability Under SEC Rule Job-5
Thus, under the Blackie approach, when fraud has affected the price of
securities, direct actual reliance is not necessary for recovery. The Blackie
court determined that a material misrepresentation or omission, causing an
inflation of the price of securities, with subsequent reliance on price by the
plaintiff, proves causation. 5 As the Ninth Circuit noted, this theory rests
on the "common sense" notion that a plaintiff does not ordinarily seek to
incur a loss by purchasing securities at an inflated price. 5 ' In order to
ensure that a causal relationship exists between the defendant's miscon-
duct and the plaintiffs loss, the Blackie court provided two ways that a
defendant may disprove causation: "(1) by disproving materiality or by
proving that, despite materiality, an insufficient number of traders relied to
inflate the price; and (2) by proving that an individual plaintiff purchased
despite knowledge of the falsity of a representation, or that he would have,
had he known of it.'
152
B. The "Fraudulent Issuance of Securities" Theory
The most recent variation of fraud-on-the-market theory of liability,
brought about by the Fifth Circuit in Shores v. Sklar,'53 allows a plaintiff
to recover without showing direct reliance if the security would not have
been issued but for the defendant's fraudulent scheme. Under this theory,
a plaintiff may recover by proving that the defendant knowingly brought
worthless securities into the market, that the plaintiff reasonably relied on
the integrity of the market in making available genuine securities, and that
the plaintiff suffered a loss resulting from the fraudulent scheme.'54 More-
over, the defendant may not rebut the plaintiff's case by proving nonreli-
ance on misleading statements or omissions.' 55
In Sklar, an Industrial Development Board issued revenue bonds for the
development of a mobile home facility. The Board secured a lease of the
premises, in order to authorize the issuance of, and pay the interest obliga-
tions on, the bonds. The defendant, an attorney who acted as bond coun-
150. Id at 908.
151. Id
152. Id. at 906. The court noted that the weight of authority favors a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reliance. Id at 906 n.22. The court doubted, however, that an opportunity to
rebut the presumption of reliance "[would] substantially reduce a defendant's liability in the
open market fraud context" because it is "[doubtful] that a defendant would be able to prove
... that a plaintiff was indifferent to a material fraud." Id at 906-07 n.22. Nevertheless, the
court felt that public policy is best served by "limiting recoveries to those who are in fact
injured, and excluding those whom a defendant proves have not been injured . I.." "d at
907 n.22. Accord Little v. First Cal. Co., 532 F.2d 1302, 1304 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976).
153. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1983).
154. 647 F.2d at 469-70.
155. Id
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sel, drafted an offering circular containing material misrepresentations and
omissions about the lessee's ability to meet its obligations under the lease.
The plaintiffs purchased the bonds, the lessee defaulted on its payments,
and the entire project failed. Although the plaintiffs never saw the offering
circular, they brought a rule lOb-5 action against the defendant. They al-
leged that the defendant and others devised a scheme to defraud the in-
vesting public in contravention of the securities laws by way of a
materially misleading offering circular that induced the board to issue, and
the public to buy, "fraudulently marketed bonds."' 56
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that if
this were a case solely involving misrepresentations and omissions under
rule lOb-5(b), then the Affiliated Ute Citizens presumption of reliance had
been successfully rebutted by the plaintiff's admitted lack of reliance on
the offering circular. I" 7 The court held that summary judgment was inap-
propriate in this case, however, because the plaintifi "alleged the necessary
elements under lOb-5[(a)] or [(c)]" for deceptive scheme or acts.' 58 The
majority stated that the purpose of rule lOb-5 in promoting "free and hon-
est securities markets" justified this conclusion.' 59
A vigorous dissent by Circuit Judge Randall accused the majority of
creating a new theory of liability that would defeat the primary purpose of
the rule-"the making of an informed investment decision"-by permit-
ting an investor who has not "elected. .. to seek to read what the seller is
obligated by the Rule to disclose" to recover damages." ° The dissent em-
phasized the need to limit the rule's judicially created private right of ac-
tion'61 and the Supreme Court's "concern that the inexorable broadening
of the class of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately
result in more harm than good."' 62 As a final policy concern, the dissent
argued that the majority's decision will protract rule lOb-5 litigation in the
federal courts that should otherwise have been resolved at the summary
judgment stage.
163
156. Id at 463-64.
157. Id at 468. See supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
158. Id at 469.
159. Id at 470.
160. Id at 473 (Randall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of cases and comments both
following and disagreeing with the Shores decision, see Note, Fraud on the Market An
Emerging Theory of Reco Yery under SEC Rule 10b-5, 50 Geo. W.L. Rev. 627, 644-45 n. 105
(1982).
161. Id at 482-83. See supra notes 10-11.
162. Id at 483 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49
(1975)). See supra note 12.
163. Id at 473.
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The dissent also found the majority's distinction between sections (a),
(b), and (c) of rule l0b-5 to be utterly lacking in precedent. 1"4 The dissent
stated that the majority's search for causation whenever the fraud alleged
"shifts from misrepresentation or omission in a document to fraud on a
broader scale" was a maneuver designed for the purpose of "[avoiding] the
result. . . mandated by the application. . . of the traditional elements of
a private cause of action under rule 10b-5."' 65 According to the dissent,
the only type of case where nonreliance as a rebuttal presumption should
not be permitted is in cases, such as Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
where there is fraud in connection with a forced sale in which a plaintiff
has no opportunity to make an investment decision.'
66
The difference of opinion between the majority and dissent in Sklar is
illustrative of the ultimate dilemma in fraud-on-the-market cases. On the
one hand, the purpose of the rule is to protect investors and ensure the
integrity of the market. Courts are thus reluctant to deny rule lOb-5 recov-
ery to private investors who have not directly relied on misstatements or
omissions but who have incurred a loss as a result of fraud affecting the
securities market. On the other hand, if the securities laws are designed to
promote knowledgeable investment decisions, it might be inappropriate to
compensate investors who do not avail themselves of the disclosure docu-
ments required by the securities laws.
III. PANZIRER V WOLF: EXTENDING THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET
THEORY
The Second Circuit's decision in Panzirer v. Wolf' 67 extends the fraud-
on-the-market theory so that investors who rely on newspaper accounts of
corporate issuers of securities may recoup losses when there have been ma-
terial misrepresentations or omissions in violation of rule lOb-5.16 8 In
164. Id at 474 n.1. But see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53
(1972).
165. Id. at 485. The dissent viewed the effect of the majority's decision as permitting a
plaintiff whose case is covered by clause (b) to rely on the provisions of clauses (a) or (c) in
order to circumvent the reliance requirement of clause (b), thereby rendering that clause "a
dead letter in the one situation in which it most typically applies--the offering of a security,
pursuant to an offering circular, to investors who are called upon to make routine invest-
ment decisions." Id at 486. The dissent felt that the majority's approach would lead to a
transformation of the rule into a form of investor's insurance and an elimination of all the
traditional requirements of proof in a cause of action under the rule. Id. at 486.
166. Id at 479-81. For a full discussion of Schlick, see supra notes 80-86 and accompa-
nying text.
167. 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982), vacated and re-
manded with instructions to dismiss with prejudice 103 S. Ct. 434 (1983).
168. 663 F.2d at 367.
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Panzirer, plaintiff brought a rule 1Ob-5 action, against Allied Artists and
Price Waterhouse alleging that the plaintiff made a losing purchase of
stock resulting from misrepresentations and omissions in Allied's report of
profits for a year in which it actually incurred a loss. The primary omis-
sion was Price Waterhouse's failure, as Allied's accountants, to qualify the
annual report by stating its doubts as to the company's ability to continue
as a going concern.1
69
Although Panzirer never saw the misleading annual report, she read
about the company in a Wall Street Journal column, "Heard on the
Street," which favorably presented Allied's decision to enter the video cas-
sette market.170 Since Panzirer was a substitute school teacher at the time,
the item on the educational use of video cassettes caught her eye. After
reading the article, she phoned her broker, asking him if he had any nega-
tive news on Allied. The broker stated that he did not follow Allied, but
after glancing at a Standard & Poor's tear sheet, told her that he did not
know of any negative news. Panzirer bought 200 shares of Allied common
stock. Shortly thereafter, Panzirer raised her order to 500 shares.
The court of appeals determined from the record that Panzirer's decision
to invest in Allied was not influenced by the price of the stock or her con-
versation with her broker. 17 1 Panzirer claimed, rather, that by relying on
the integrity of the market in producing information reported in the Wall
Street Journal, she indirectly relied on the annual report. 172 She thus al-
leged a four part causational chain: "[I]f Allied's report had been accurate,
the stock analysts interviewed by the Journal would not have mentioned
the company favorably, the Journal would not have devoted two
paragraphs to Allied's prospects. . . and [she] would not have been led by
169. Id
170. Marcial, Prospects/or New Home Video Equipment Spark Analyst Optimism About
the Industry, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1978, at 47, col. 3. Relevant portions of the article are as
follows:
Several analysts contend that Allied Artists is in a good position to take advan-
tage of the growing demand for video tapes, having pioneered the development of
prerecorded cassettes.
Andrew G. Raez, of Philips, Appel & Walden, Inc., says Allied Artists, besides
having a head start in video tapes and cassettes, is negotiating with TV networks,
other film producers and makers of educational films to put their films on video
cassettes. 'The educational and informational area constitutes a tremendous mar-
ket for video cassettes.' says Mr. Raez, adding: 'We continue to be bullish on Al-
lied Artists. It's an attractive, turnaround situation.'
171. 663 F.2d at 367. Panzirer asserted three versions of the facts precipitating her
purchase. See [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,363 at 97,430-37.
These three versions of the facts are set forth supra note 48.
172. 663 F.2d at 367.
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the article to buy her stock."' 17 3
Price Waterhouse and Allied argued that the allegedly false financial
statements were unrelated to the third party statements about the com-
pany's prospects in the video cassette market as reported in the Wall Street
Journal, and therefore could not have induced Panzirer's purchase. 174 In
the alternative, they argued that even if Panzirer is entitled to a presump-
tion of reliance under an extension of Affiliated Ute Citizens to cases in-
volving misrepresentations and omissions, that presumption of reliance
was rebutted by Panzirer's admission that she neither read nor heard the
information in the annual report.' 75 Finally, defendants argued that
Panzirer could not proceed under a fraud-on-the-market theory since she
relied on a source other than the market price of Allied's stock.' 7 6 District
Court Judge Motley, agreeing with defendants' position that any presump-
tion of reliance under an Affiliated Ute Citizens or fraud-on-the-market
theory had been rebutted, granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment.'
77
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that Panzirer's complaint sufficiently stated a causal nexus be-
tween her loss and the annual report to withstand a motion for summary
judgment. '7 1 While recognizing that the element of reliance serves to limit
the plaintiff class to those investors who are in fact injured by the fraud,
Judge Lumbard determined that the fraud need only be a "substantial" or
"significant contributing cause" of a rule 1Ob-5 plaintiffs reliance.'79 In
support of its conclusion that Panzirer, who never saw the allegedly fraud-
173. Id
174. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,363, 97,436-37. See
Price Waterhouse's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, file 1982, at 9-10: "We emphasize what is not involved in this case. The
decision below did not involve a claim of liability based upon reports in the media repeat-
ing, summarizing or referring to the issuer's allegedly false financial statements or to the
independent accountants' opinion thereon." (emphasis added).
175. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,251, 97,267.
176. Id 97,363, at 97,436:
Plaintiff relied on a newspaper article concerning Allied's video cassette business
and a discussion with her broker, also concerning Allied's video cassette business.
Neither plaintiff nor her broker had read the 1978 Annual Report; moreover,
neither plaintiff nor her broker had read the 'tear sheet's' financial information
regarding Allied. While plaintiff relied, in part, upon a discussion with her broker,
this discussion did not concern Allied's financial statements or condition. Thus,
there is no genuine issue as to whether plaintiff relied primarily on another source;
the record shows that the presumption of reliance has been rebutted.
177. Id
178. 663 F.2d at 367.
179. Id.
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ulent document, had sufficiently alleged cause in fact, the court reasoned
that "[a]s in Competitive Associates, the fact that [Panzirer] must trace her
reliance on defendant's alleged fraud through the reactions of third parties
does not vitiate her claim under Rule lOb-5." 180
Having found that Panzirer need not prove direct reliance, the court
cited Affiliated Ute Citizens as establishing a presumption of reliance'
8 '
and supporting the theory that direct reliance is no longer necessary when
fraud causes an investor's loss through its effect on the market price of
securities.' 2 Thus, Judge Lumbard asserted that under the Blackie fraud-
on-the-market theory, "the materiality of a fraud creates a presumption of
reliance through its presumed effect on the market" permitting a finding of
causation. '
8 3
The court found the Blackie rationale dispositive even though Panzirer
relied on the "integrity of the market in producing information reported in
The Wall Street Journal" and not on the "integrity of the market price." 8 4
Justifying its extension of Blackie, the court reasoned that "U]ust as a ma-
terial misrepresentation or omission is presumed to affect the price of the
stock, so it should be presumed to affect the information [reported in The
Wall Street Journal]."'85
IV. PANzI;wR: EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF RULE 10e-5 LIABILITY
Panzirer illustrates the problems and confusion courts encounter in at-
tempting to define the element of reliance and its relationship to material-
ity and causation in modem rule lOb-5 litigation. The court recognizes
that the traditional purpose of the reliance requirement is "to permit only
those injured by fraud to sue,"'8 6 but it also points out that direct reliance
on material misrepresentations and omissions is no longer a prerequisite to
establishing causation in every private right of action brought pursuant to
the rule.'8 7 The Panzirer court fails, however, to distinguish between the
various theories that have developed over the years to relieve plaintiffs of
180. Id at 367-68.





186. Id at 367 (citing Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92
(2d Cir. 1981)).
187. Id at 368 ("[J]ust as a material misrepresentation or omission is presumed to affect
the price of the stock, so it should be presumed to affect the information [reported in The
Wal Street Journal].
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the burden of proving direct reliance and the factual contexts that have
rendered proof of direct reliance inappropriate.
The Panzirer court sought support for its holding in the Competitive As-
sociates decision,' which unlike Panzirer, involved an unlawful scheme
to defraud of which misrepresentations and omissions were only one as-
pect.'89 In Competitive Associates, the plaintifi's nonreliance on the mis-
leading annual report was arguably unrelated to the fact that the
defendant's scheme induced the plaintiff to retain the investment manage-
ment company." 9 In Panzirer, however, no such collateral conduct was
proven--the alleged violation was solely the misrepresentations and omis-
sions in the annual report. In cases where the alleged fraud is the misrep-
resentation and omission of material fact in violation of rule lOb-5(b),
even the most expansive interpretations of Affiliated Ute Citizens have left
room for a rebuttal of the reliance presumption by permitting a defendant
to prove that the plaintiff did not rely on the deceptive comments.' 9' Even
if Panzirer is entitled to a presumption of reliance under the objective the-
ory of liability, that presumption was rebutted by her own admission that
she neither read nor heard the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations or
omissions in the annual report.1 92
Moreover, Panzirer is not wholly consonant with the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory of recovery. Even though Panzirer may have been able to prove
that defendants' misrepresentations and omissions were material and that
the price of stock was thereby artificially inflated, she could not recover
under Blackie because she did not rely on the price of stock when making
her investment decision.' 93 In order to allow Panzirer to litigate her claim,
the court has extended the fraud-on-the-market theory to plaintiffs who
rely on the accuracy of statements made by those working in or reporting
on the securities markets. 94
The Panzirer court's extension of Blackie to situations where fraudulent
comments affect newspaper reporting by way of analogy, 95 seems con-
vincing at first blush. While this approach recognizes the far reaching ef-
fect that a fraudulent statement may have, it fails to account for the
difference between reliance on price and reliance on newspapers in con-
188. 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975); see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
189. 516 F.2d at 814.
190. Id; see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
191. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982); see also supra notes 102-113 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
193. Id
194. 663 F.2d at 367.
195. Id at 368.
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nection with the purpose of the securities laws. Price is an integral aspect
of the securities markets. The price of stock provides a rational basis upon
which investment decisions may be made. If the securities laws are
designed to protect investors and create confidence in the nation's securi-
ties markets, then it is consistent with congressional intent to punish and
prevent deceptive activities that manipulate securities prices.' 96
When a plaintiff purchases stock at an artificially inflated price it may be
reasonable to eliminate the burden of proving actual reliance as a prereq-
uisite to establishing causation. In these circumstances, the "causal nexus
can be adequately established indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled
with the common sense that a stock purchaser does not ordinarily seek to
purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated stock."' 9 7 While com-
mon sense may tell us that it is reasonable to assume that an investor relies
on price, that same common sense tells us that it is unreasonable to make
investment decisions based on comments as reported in the newspaper.
On the other hand, the Panzirer court's extension of the fraud-on-the-
market theory realistically appraises the role of full and accurate disclo-
sure as a policy underlying section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.' 9 Panzirer recog-
nizes the importance of full disclosure of information, as did the dissent in
Sklar, 99 by imposing liability on those who issue material misstatements
or omissions that may influence investment decisions through the media.
Unlike the dissent in Sklar, however, the Panzirer court implicitly ac-
knowledges the fact that the highly technical information required to be
disclosed under the securities laws is incomprehensible to the ordinary in-
vestor. Consequently, this information is normally communicated indi-
rectly to the ordinary investor through recommendations by industry
professionals2co
Panzirer did not rely on her broker's recommendations. Even if she had
so relied, her broker did not rely on the allegedly fraudulent financial in-
formation. Rather, Panzirer attempted to trace her reliance to the annual
report through The Wall Street Journal. Because the Journal did not men-
tion or summarize Allied's financial condition, Panzirer asserted that the
analysts mentioned in the article would not have favorably presented Al-
lied's prospects in the video cassette market had the annual report been
196. See supra note 4 discussing the underlying purposes of the rule; see also supra notes
8-11.
197. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); see also supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 4.
199. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
200. See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSUR 14, 22, 27-28 (1979).
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complete and accurate. 20 1 In other words, Panzirer relied on a Wall Street
Journal article that relied on analysts who relied on the annual report.
Even though Panzirer offered no evidence that the analysts actually relied
on the annual report and that her reliance must be traced through two
intermediaries, the court concluded that the allegedly fraudulent annual
report was a "substantial factor" in Panzirer's purchase of Allied's
StoCk.
202
The court used a Blackie analysis to justify this conclusion, finding that
the materiality of misrepresentations or omissions establishes "a presump-
tion of reliance through its presumed effect on the market."2" 3 In Blackie,
plaintiffs relied on the integrity of market price and thus indirectly on the
truthfulness of the statements underlying the price. The materiality of the
misrepresentations and omissions established a presumption that other
traders relied on the statements, thereby providing a causal link between
the fraud and the inflated price. When plaintiffs purchased at the inflated
price, the causational chain between the fraud and the loss was com-
plete.2"4 In order to ensure that only those injured by the fraud may re-
cover damages, the Blackie court provided the defendant with an
opportunity to rebut the presumption of causation by showing that an in-
sufficient number of traders relied on misinformation so as to inflate the
price.
205
While the Panzirer court afforded Price Waterhouse and Allied Artists
an opportunity to challenge the causational chain during a trial on the
merits,2° its decision may have an adverse impact on analysts and report-
ers. In order to rebut the Panzirer's prima facie showing of causation, de-
fendants would have to prove that the stock analysts interviewed by The
Wall Street Journal did not rely on the annual reports. Analysts voicing
opinions to the press and reporters may become subject to extensive dis-
covery as well as exposure to rule lOb-5 liability for allegedly unsubstanti-
ated statements. The net result may be an unwillingness on the part of
analysts to disseminate information to the public through the media and a
chilling effect on the media's right to report on issuers and their securities.
V. CONCLUSION
The Panzirer court has extended the fraud-on-the-market theory to per-
mit a plaintiff with an attenuated causal connection between a losing
201. 663 F.2d at 367.
202. Id
203. Id at 368.
204. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906. See supra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
205. 524 F.2d at 906-07 n.22. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
206. 663 F.2d at 367.
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purchase of stock and an allegedly misleading annual report, to survive a
motion for summary judgment. Thus, Panzirer seems to serve public pol-
icy by recognizing that ordinary investors make use of the securities laws'
disclosure policy through communications with securities professionals.
On the other hand, Panzirer broadens the potential class of plaintiffs
who may sue, ultimately resulting in protraction of rule lOb-5 litigation in
the federal courts that could otherwise be resolved at the summary judg-
ment stage.2 °7
Moreover, Panzirer potentially enlarges the potential plaintiff class to
those purchasers or sellers who read the newspaper or have contact with
those working in the securities market. Thus, it may make an issuer's or
accountant's liability dependent upon third party recommendations. In do-
ing so, Panzirer weakens the causational link between the allegedly viola-
tive behavior and the plaintiff's loss. The decision also brings both
analysts quoted by the press and the press itself into the arena of rule lOb-5
litigation and liability. Panzirer thus raises important policy issues that the
Supreme Court may have to resolve at a later date.
Julie A. Heisel
207. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975); see also
nspra. notes 12 & 162 and accompanying text.
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